Delaware Chancery Court provides helpful drafting tips in Earnout case

After taking the summer off from blogging, its time to write again. I thought I would go back to one of my favorite topics to discuss - one often ripe for dispute - earnouts. An interesting decision by the Delaware Chancery Court last month raises some drafting issues.

The case involves a dispute over an EBITA-based earnout between sellers of a life-sciences startup and buyer, AmerisourceBergen Corporation. The deal involved a $21 million closing payment and an earnout of $55 million based on 2003 and 2004 results. Because Sellers saw this deal as giving them access to a larger marketing platform, they obtained buyer's agreement to exclusively promote seller's products as part of AmerisourceBergen's marketing pitches. The merger agreement also included language expressly requiring buyer to use "good faith" and not undertake any actions that would impede the earnout benefits to the sellers.

Notwithstanding these seller-favorable provisions and a finding by the Court in favor of liability for breaching the agreement, on this issue the Court only awarded nominal damages of 6 cents. (The Court did award $21 million on a separate claim that the earnout metric was miscalcuated, so the sellers did have something to celebrate). So, a liquidated damages clause may have been useful here to the sellers.

Another issue was cost control as related to the earnout computation. The agreement clause did not prevent sellers from controlling (reducing) its expenses during the earnout period. A buyer in this case may consider providing that any reductions in expenses (that are not buyer-approved) will get backed out of the EBITDA or other similar earnout metric. Conversely, sellers should try to control as much of the action as possible, so buyer's increases in overall corporate spending do not dilute their earnout.

The term "average" was also in dispute. Buyer argued that average meant "weighted average," while the contract was silent. The court did not find this argument compelling ("the most straightforward usage of the term 'average' is an arithmetic mean, or an average in which each term is given equal weight"). So, if you mean weighted average, you need to say so in the agreement and then spell out the rules on how the weighting is going to work.

The case also presents an example where the parties departed from GAAP in defining the Adjusted EBITA and the Court enforced their agreement, as opposed to referring back to what GAAP may require.

Recent Massachusetts decision on director and shareholder duties

A recent decision by the Massachusetts Superior Court for Suffolk county (Boylan v. Boston Sand & Gravel Co., 2007 WL 836753 (Mass.Super.) has a very good synthesis of duties owed by directors and stockholders of Massachusetts corporations:

"[The defendants] as directors of [the company] , owed a fiduciary duty to the corporation, which included both a duty of care and a duty of loyalty. Demoulas v. Demoulas Super Markets, Inc., 424 Mass. 501, 528 (1997). Since they were both directors and shareholders of [the company] and since [the company]was a closely-held corporation, they owed their fellow shareholders, ..., “substantially the same duty of utmost good faith and loyalty in the operation of the enterprise that partners owe to one another, a duty that is even stricter than that required of directors and shareholders in corporations generally.” Id. at 529; Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 367 Mass. 578, 592-594 (1975).

*7 If [the defendants] wished [the company] to engage in a self-dealing transaction ... they must:
1. make full and honest disclosure of all the known material facts of the proposed transaction, including the details of the transaction and their conflict of interest; Demoulas at 531. See Puritan Medical Ctr. Inc. v. Cashman, 413 Mass. 167, 172 (1992); Dynan v. Fritz, 400 Mass. 230, 243 (1987) (“good faith requires a full and honest disclosure of all relevant circumstances to permit a disinterested decision maker to exercise its informed judgment”); ALI Principles of Corporate Governance § 5.02(a) (1994); and
2. “then either receive the assent of disinterested directors or shareholders, or otherwise prove that the decision is fair to the corporation.” Demoulas at 533. The burden of proving that the assenting directors were disinterested rests with the self-dealing directors, see Houle v. Low, 407 Mass. 810, 824 (1990), as does the burden of proving that the self-dealing was “intrinsically fair, and did not result in harm to the corporation or partnership” if the transaction was approved by self-interested directors. Demoulas at 530-531, quoting Meehan v. Shaughnessy, 404 Mass. 419, 441 (1989).


If the self-dealing directors fail to provide full disclosure of the material facts of their proposed transaction, then they breach their fiduciary duty by proceeding with the transaction, regardless of its approval by the Board or its fairness to the corporation. See Geller v. Allied-Lyons PLC, 42 Mass.App.Ct. 120, 128 (1997) (“full disclosure of all material facts respecting the finder's fee agreement [is] a prerequisite for enforcement”). The Board's approval is vitiated by the failure of full disclosure.

If the self-dealing directors provide full disclosure to the Board and the transaction is approved by the disinterested directors, then the decision enjoys the deference provided by the business judgment rule. See Harhen v. Brown, 431 Mass. 838, 847 (2000). If the self-dealing directors provide full disclosure to the Board and the transaction is approved by self-interested directors, the decision does not enjoy the benefit of the business judgment rule and must be demonstrated to be fair to the corporation. Demoulas at 533."

Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals opines on earnout in roll-up case

To take a little break from recent posts on Delaware case law, I thought I would comment a little on a new decision by the Fourth Circuit involving an earnout provision. The case, Vaughan v. Recall Total Information Management, can be read here. Vaughn involves a failed earnout in a roll-up acquisition and presents an interesting case study.

Earnouts have become prevalent in today's M&A environment. Buyers often are cautious about projections offered by sellers and rely on earnouts to reach a middle ground. The difficulty lies in agreeing on earnout targets and formulas. Sellers typically prefer to measure in terms of sales/revenues, while buyers want to measure actual profitability of performance, often using relying of EBIDTA or net income as a metric. While an earnout may be a decent option for a seller that intends to stay involved in the business, for a business owner (such as financial investor) that truly wants an exit, it presents a substantial risk. Conversely, buyers are often at risk for being a target for litigation when things go wrong and targets are not met.

The Vaughan case illustrates some of the potential problems with earnouts. Seller (SDA) ran a successful document shredding business that was acquired by Buyer (Recall). The total price was approximately $27 million, with almost $12 million being subject to an earnout payable in two installments over 12 months after closing. The earnout formula was based on sales revenues of buyer, and to earn the full earnout, the revenues for the acquired business would need to increase almost 50% over the 12 month earnout period. This aggressive target, together with heavy weighting of the earnout (app. 40% of the total price), put this deal in a high risk category.

Not surprisingly, a key issue in the litigation was whether seller was entitled to count certain sales revenues of buyer toward the earnout. After this acquisition, Recall acquired a number other document shredding companies. A key question became exactly who was responsible for the acquisitions, and for the revenues they ultimately delivered. The Agreement defined Sales Revenue broadly, to include "all gross revenue generated by the Company from new contracts or agreements from any source for document shredding services." The earnout provision in the Purchase Agreement also placed an express duty on the Buyer to use good faith allow Seller to maximize its earnout potential ("Purchaser agrees to act reasonably in good faith to allow [Seller] to have a fair opportunity to qualify for the maximum payments provided for by this [earnout]....").

Intepreting this provision, both the Fourth Circuit and the underlying federal trial court found that the sales revenues should include those from certain follow-on acquisitions. Considering how broad the "any source" language was, this decision is not surprising. The court also acknowledged that while this result may be due to poor drafting, it is not their role to supervene. ("While it is conceivable that the parties' failure to be more explicit concerning Recall's subsequent acquisition revenue was due to poor drafting rather than the actual intent of the parties, it is not the role of the court to speculate or rewrite the terms of the Agreement....")

Vaughn presents a good case study for companies engaged in roll-up strategies, and to their sellers. If follow-on acquisitions, or "tuck-ins" are planned, it is important to expressly carve them out of any earnout provision. Sellers, on the other hand, need to protect themselves from the unknown. If you can get paid in cash and get it upfront, good work. If not, dont assume you will ever get your full earnout. It is probably unrealistic for most sellers to demand consent rights or a buyout of the earnout in the event of follow-on acquisitions. That said, sellers may be wise to insist on a careful segregation of the sold business to facilitate an earnout calculation, and as here, to insist on "good faith" language to encourage the buyer's good behavior.

What do VCs want from their CEOs

What do VCs really want from their CEOs? A recent study by VentureOne shows that #1 is sales and marketing, followed by operations leadership, financial management and product development.

The study summary can be found here

This study of VCs and CEOs reflects some interesting, but not surprising statistics about board members in startups and tech companies.

• most companies have 4-7 board seats, with 4-5 being the highest out of that range. 5 is a pretty common number, since that avoids a deadlock.

• in about 1/3 of the companies, the VCs hold 20-40% of the seats; in about 1/3, it's 40-60%. Again, a board of 5, 1-2 seats is commonplace.
• conversely, company management holds 20% or less on most boards - 1 seat for the CEO then in office is pretty common. If that CEO is also the founder, and later is displaced from the CEO office, it is common for the founder to remain as the Chairman of the Board.
• As far as compensation for Board membership, it looks like most companies do not compensate their directors in any way, and that a minority does so with stock options. Cash and stock seems to be a more phenomenon, which makes a lot of sense considering how cash dependent most startups tend to be.
• It is a bit surprising to find that both VCs and CEO agreed that the most significant value of a VC boardmember is for help with financings and locating investors. The answer I would have expected from the VCs is their business expertise and strategic vision is their most valuable asset. Sales and marketing experience is valued, albeit in second place.
• Finally, "dilution of investment" is cited as the biggest factor of conflict on a board. This is a good reminder that while your investors are usually aligned with the founder's interests, when it comes investment time, all bets are usually off and its every man (or VC) for him/herself. This is especially true if you have been lucky enough to have had multiple investment rounds (or "series") and have various illustrious investors on your board. Since this is something that most investors fully acknowledge, founders should not be afraid to voice their concerns about potential conflicts and should seek to have at least some disinterested (independent) directors on their board.

Recent Massachusetts case on corporate freezeouts

A recent decision by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) found that in a close corporation context, the estate of one of the company’s founders that was a minority shareholder was not entitled to a buyout. See here for the opinion: http://www.socialaw.com/slip.htm?cid=16741&sid=120

The court stated that in a freeze-out situation, the buyout is not the only reasonable remedy. Instead, since the freeze-out denies the minority’s “reasonable expectations of benefit” of being a stockholder, the remedy should, to the extent possible, restore to the minority shareholder those benefits reasonably expected, but not received because of the breach.

The court explained that “in ordering the defendants to purchase the plaintiff’s stock at the price of her pro rata share of the company, the judge created an artificial market for the plaintiff’s minority share of a close corporation — an asset that, by definition, has little or no market value.” This is a very interesting position, considering all of the ado over 409A and stock option valuations for startup companies in the last few years.