Thursday, May 24, 2007

Delaware Supreme Court rejects theory that creditors may directly sue Boards of insolvent corporations for breach of fiduciary duty

A strong decision last week by the Delaware Supreme Court, NACEPF v. Gheewalla et al., protecting the boards of insolvent companies from creditor claims, may be another significant reason to incorporate in Delaware.

"Zone of insolvency"... Ahh. Makes me wistfully think back to the days of F*ckedCompany.com, circa 2002, sitting in scores of board meetings of companies that were soon to meet their maker. You all know the typical scenario. Company X raises %10-15M of venture capital in one or more rounds, market adoption slows and investors decide that another investment is probably not prudent. So they gently get out of the way, letting the management know that they won't lead the next round but would follow another lead. Burn rate is at a pretty good pace, and management ignores the VC body language, assuming that the cache of their past investors will help find new ones quickly, and that a follow is just as good anyway.

When things don't work as planned, and cash starts to get real tight, a board meeting is called where a new lawyer from your corporate law firm appears - their bankruptcy guy - and tells you that you probably need to shut the company down, or face potential claims from creditors because you are now in the "zone of insolvency". What is that, you say? Well, generally, the "zone" is when a company cannot pay its debts when they become due, such as payroll or vendor payables, etc. So now, he claims, you will face claims from creditors who don't get paid unless you shut the company down now, while there is still money left to pay. You shrug because that state probably describes the company from day one, so that just cannot be case. Otherwise, how do companies get started?

Unfortunately, this issue has plagued startups for the last decade, and probably has resulted in a good share of startups being shut down, when they may have made it in the end. Last week, the Delaware Supreme Court put an end to the dilemma by holding, in no uncertain terms, that "the creditors of a Delaware corporation that is either insolvent or in the zone of insolvency have no right, as a matter of law, to assert direct claims for breach of fiduciary duty against the corporation’s directors."

The Court agreed with the Chancery Court in its reasoning that “an otherwise solvent corporation operating in the zone of insolvency is one in most need of effective and proactive leadership—as well as the ability to negotiate in good faith with its creditors—goals which would likely be significantly undermined by the prospect of individual liability arising from the pursuit of direct claims by creditors.”

Because this has been such an important issue for academics and practioners alike, the Court noted that "the need for providing directors with definitive guidance compels us to hold that no direct claim for breach of fiduciary duties may be asserted by the creditors of a solvent corporation that is operating in the zone of insolvency. " When a solvent corporation is navigating in the zone of insolvency, the Court emphasized that the focus for Delaware directors does not change: " directors must continue to discharge their fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders by exercising their business judgment in the best interests of the corporation for the benefit of its shareholder owners."

It is important to note that this decision does not completely eliminate Board liability for any claims, but just those claims that are "direct" claims brought by the creditors. In general, claims against a Board can be direct or derivative, depending on a myriad of factors, including how and to whom the harm occurs. A derivative claim is a claim brought by the corporation that has suffered from the misconduct of directors, and typically must be reviewed by an independent committee as to whether the claim is a valid one. Therefore, while the NACEPF decision does leave room for creditors to bring derivative claims, the risk is diminished that the threat of such an action would chill board members from continuing to serve and from making hard decisions in distressed circumstances.

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